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Eluding the Grim Reaper: How Section 2
of the Defense of Marriage Act Could
Survive Strict Scrutiny
By Michael DiSiena*
“The legislative department is everywhere
extending the sphere of its activity and drawing
all power into its impetuous vortex . . . . [I]t is
against the enterprising ambition of this
department that the people ought to indulge all
their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.”1
~Federalist No. 48
“[I]n order to form a proper judgment of the
probable effects of this plan of general government
on the sovereignties of the several states, it is
necessary also to take a view of what Congress may,
constitutionally, do and of what the states may not do.”2
~Antifederalist No. 44

Table of Contents
I.
II.
III.
IV.

Introduction .................................................................................. 152
Congress’s Article IV Power........................................................ 156
Strict Scrutiny: Pulling the Right Trigger .................................... 162
DOMA's Compelling Interest....................................................... 167
A. Narrow Tailoring ................................................................... 177
B. Least Restrictive Means ........................................................ 179
C. Jettisoning Moral Pretension ................................................. 180
V. Conclusion.................................................................................... 182

* J.D., 2013, Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A., Siena College.
The author owes a debt of gratitude to Professor Joan Shaughnessy, without whose help this
project would have foundered amid the seas of his own inability.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 343–44 (James Madison) (Benjamin Wright ed., 1961).
2. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 44, at 124 (Samuel Bryan) (Morton Borden ed.,
1965).

151

152

19 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 151 (2012)
I. Introduction

Victories for proponents of same-sex marriage, both in scope and in
number, continue to expand.3 Six states, in addition to the District of
Columbia, currently recognize same-sex marriage.4 Two more states seem
poised to follow suit.5 These statewide victories should rekindle debate
over the constitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).6
Adding fuel to the fire, in early 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
announced that it would no longer defend the constitutionality of Section 3
of DOMA, which excludes same-sex couples from the definition of
federally-recognized marriages.7 Only months later, DOJ went one step
further, and filed a brief actively arguing that DOMA was unconstitutional.8
DOJ reasoned that DOMA could not survive a heightened form of judicial
scrutiny, which would require the government to show that DOMA serves a
compelling interest.9 The shifting political dynamics underlying the issue of
3. See Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex
Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at A1 (reporting
on the legalization of same-sex marriage by New York State through the legislative process);
see also Adam Nagourney, Court Strikes Down Ban on Gay Marriage in California, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, at A1 (reporting the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Perry v. Brown, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 499 (2011), that invalidated an amendment to the California State Constitution that
banned same-sex marriage).
4. See Kim Murphy, Washington State Makes 7: Governor Signs Gay Marriage
Law, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, http://www.latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/
2012/02/washington-governor-signs-law-legalizing-same-sex-marriage.html (last visited
May 15, 2013) (reporting the legalization of same-sex marriage in Washington, listing other
states where same-sex marriage is legal, and giving the eventual date the Washington law
goes into effect) (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
5. See Annie Linskey, O’Malley to Sign Gay Marriage Bill Today, BALT. SUN, Mar.
1, 2012, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/blog/bal-omalley-to-signsamesex-marriage-bill-today-20120229,0,1317765.story (last visited May 15, 2013) (reporting on the legalization of same-sex marriage in Maryland and the eventual date that the
law goes into effect) (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
6. See generally Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
7. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker
of the House (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Letter] (notifying Congress that the Department of
Justice will no longer defend DOMA because it believes the law to be unconstitutional) (on
file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (“In determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse”
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
8. See generally Brief for Defendant in Opposition of Motion to Dismiss, Golinski v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-00257 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2010).
9. See Letter, supra note 7.
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same-sex marriage likely account for this dramatic development. But the
legal terrain has shifted as well. Eight Years after DOMA was passed, no
state had yet legalized same-sex marriage.10 For this reason, Section 2 of
the law, which permits states to refuse to grant recognition to same-sex
marriages performed outside their borders, had no immediate legal
consequences when it was first adopted. As the number of states
recognizing same-sex marriage grows, Section 2 may become increasingly
central to the debate over the constitutionality of DOMA. At issue will be
whether Congress has the power to abrogate state obligations under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and, if so, whether such
congressional action must still be reconciled with the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment.
The passage of DOMA was motivated by federal actors’ concern that
Hawaii was on the cusp of legalizing same-sex marriage.11 The Full Faith
and Credit Clause provides that “[f]ull faith and credit shall be given in
each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every
other state.”12 Opponents of same-sex marriage feared that other states
would be forced to confer full legal validity on same-sex marriages that
took place in Hawaii, thus potentially effecting sweeping change in U.S.
marriage law.13 Hoping to avoid this result, DOMA ensures that no state
need give legal effect to same-sex unions performed in other states.14
DOMA was passed with overwhelming support in 1996.15
The constitutional authority on which Congress relied when enacting
Section 2 of DOMA, stems from the Effects Clause, which immediately
10. See Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003)
(holding that the Massachusetts Constitution required the state to recognize same-sex
marriage, thus making Massachusetts the first state in the union to do so).
11. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1966 (1996) (stating that opponents of samesex marriage feared states might have to recognize same-sex marriages in Hawaii without
federal legislation).
12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
13. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 1965–68 (explaining the recognition of out-of-state
marriages in choice of law doctrine).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (“No State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State . . . or
a right or claim arising from such relationship.”).
15. See generally Final Vote Results for Role Call 316, (Jul. 12, 1996, 2:21 PM)
http://clerk.house. gov/evs/ 1996/roll316.xml; Roll Call Vote, (Sept. 10, 1996, 2:42 PM)
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/ LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=104
& session=2&vote=00280 (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
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follows the Full Faith and Credit Clause.16 Under the Effects Clause,
Congress “may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts,
records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.”17
Together, these two clauses compose Section 1 of Article IV. According to
the reasoning of DOMA’s drafters, the Effects Clause enables Congress to
contract the extent of the faith and credit requirements imposed on the
states by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, even to the point of eliminating
them altogether.18 There is considerable debate over whether Congress
does have such power and, if so, whether there are limits on its exercise.19
To say that Congress retains the power to prescribe the extent of sisterstate effect under the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not to resolve the
constitutionality of DOMA. Additionally, congressional action pursuant to
its Article IV power must comport with the due process protections
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.20 When such protections are invoked,
judicial review takes on varying levels of scrutiny. In times past, one could
fairly assume that judicial review of DOMA would not take on the form of
strict scrutiny.21 In light of doctrinal developments in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, it is now prudent to assume the opposite.22 The judiciary has
become increasingly sensitive to laws that engender “the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected.”23 To survive a constitutional challenge, Section
2 of DOMA may have to withstand the most searching form of judicial
inquiry, one that requires the government to demonstrate a compelling
interest advanced by its legislation.
It is the contention of this note that Section 2 of DOMA is a proper
exercise of congressional power under Article IV, and that Section 2 could
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.
17. Id.
18. See Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy,
76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 933 (1998) (arguing against the power of Congress to enact DOMA
under the Effects Clause).
19. See Gillian Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1468, 1473 (2007) (listing the scholarship exploring the constitutionality of DOMA).
20. See id. at 1523–31 (arguing that due process protections curb congressional power
under the Effects Clause).
21. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (applying rational review to
laws that discriminated against homosexuals).
22. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (concluding that legislation that served to discriminate against homosexuals
could not be cured by resorting to the state’s police power to regulate communal morals).
23. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996).
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survive strict judicial review. To reach this conclusion, I rely on a classic
conception of Congress’s power under the Exceptions Clause, and propose
a novel way of characterizing the federal interest advanced by Section 2 of
DOMA. I argue that the compelling interest furthered by Section 2 of
DOMA consists in preserving state control and limiting federal control over
questions of public morality. This justification stands apart from any
substantive moral outcome, tethering itself instead to the procedural norms
underlying federalism. This approach contains attractive elements for both
supporters and critics of DOMA. On one hand, it ensures that the question
of same-sex marriage will be resolved at the state level rather than by the
federal judiciary. On the other hand, it counsels an abandonment of any
reliance on moral arguments, thus excising a central argument against
same-sex marriage from the constitutional debate.
Part I examines the historical underpinnings of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and attempts to justify a broad reading of congressional
power over interstate relations under that same clause. Having already
presumed that strict scrutiny would apply to judicial review of Section 2,
Part II concludes that such review would be triggered by concerns over
invidious discrimination, rather than by concerns over any supposed
infringement of fundamental rights. Part III engages in equal protection
analysis and proposes a new argument for how Section 2 could survive
strict scrutiny.
Before going further, it may be worthwhile to pause to highlight what
this note is not. It is not a substantive argument for the wisdom of DOMA.
Nor is it an effort to engage in a debate over the merits of same-sex
marriage. Instead, it is an investigation into a particular exercise of
congressional power and the constitutional justifications underlying that
exercise. Indeed, to conclude that Section 2 of DOMA is constitutional is
not to conclude that DOMA ought to be the law of the land. Rather, it is to
conclude that the demise of Section 2, if it is to come at all, must come at
the hands of our congressional representatives.
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II. Congress’s Article IV Power

An adequate understanding of Congress’s authority over interstate
relations contemplated in Section 1 of Article IV requires a brief
investigation into the drafting history of the text. As Justice Frankfurter
cautioned, “[i]t is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution.”24 We risk
erroneous interpretation when we overlook the insights embedded in a
historical account of the text. That is particularly true when, as in the case
of Congress’s power to contract the scope of faith and credit requirements,
there is little judicial guidance.25
The immediate predecessor to the Full Faith and Credit Clause was a
similar provision in the Articles of Confederation.26 Indeed, the new clause
so closely paralleled the one contained in the Articles that there was little
debate over its adoption at the Constitutional Convention.27 Early courts
interpreting the faith and credit requirement of the Articles viewed them as
“chiefly intended to oblige each state to receive the records of another as
full evidence of such acts and judicial proceedings.”28 The “full faith and
credit” of the Articles referred not to any general obligation states had to
replicate the effect of an out-of-state act, record, or judgment, but rather to
the evidentiary weight accorded to these out-of-state matters in sister-state
courts.29
Shortly after the Articles of Confederation were adopted, a committee
appointed by the Continental Congress to examine the adequacy of the faith
and credit provisions reported that there remained a need for explaining
“the operation of the acts and judicial proceedings of the courts of one State
24. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (contending that the Court’s opinion overemphasized textualism
at the expense of lessons that can be learned from practice).
25. See Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 273 n.18 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (“[W]hile Congress clearly has the power to increase the measure of faith and credit
that a State must accord to the laws or judgments of another State, there is at least some
question whether Congress may cut back on the measure of faith and credit required by a
decision of this Court.”).
26. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 3.
27. See Paul Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 1586, 1607
(2009) (describing the relationship between the faith and credit clause in the Articles and the
Full Faith and Credit Clause in the Constitution).
28. James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188, 191–92 (Pa. C.P. 1786).
29. See Engdahl, supra note 27, at 1589 (explaining the original meaning of the term
“faith and credit”).
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contravening those of the States in which they were asserted.”30 The implication of the committee’s suggestion is clear: even after the adoption of
these provisions, the effect of out-of-state acts or proceedings in different
states remained an open question.
While it is true that James Madison would describe the faith and credit
requirement of the Articles as “extremely indeterminate,”31 there is simply
no basis for concluding that the framers of the Constitution’s Full Faith and
Credit Clause ascribed a new meaning that departed from the common
construction given to the faith and credit requirement of the Articles.32 The
limited debate over the adoption of the Full Faith and Credit and Effects
provisions bolsters this contention. The indomitable Gouverneur Morris
offered a key early proposal that would have couched discretion over the
extent of faith and credit in the federal legislative branch.33 Still more,
Morris advocated for language that actually would have required Congress
to determine the effect given to statutes of other states. Inveterate Antifederalist Edmund Randolph discerned in Morris’s proposal a federal power
“so loose as to give it opportunities of usurping all the State powers.”34
It was, perhaps, in response to Randolph’s concerns that Madison
made his decisive proposal.35 Madison recommended that full faith and
credit “shall” be given, and that Congress “may” determine the scope of
sister-state effect. The consequence of Madison’s proposal was to ensure
that congressional silence on the question of sister-state effect would not
preclude state enforcement of the faith and credit command while, at the
same time, empowering Congress to prescribe sister-state effect at its
discretion. So, while states would be compelled to grant full faith and
credit, Congress was free to abrogate that requirement by promulgating
“general laws.”36
30. 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–89, at 894 (1912).
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 1, at 326.
32. See Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV.
1201, 1206 (2009) (“[T]he only self-executing portion of the Clause was evidentiary in
nature: it obliged states to admit sister-state records into evidence but did not mandate the
substantive effect those records should have. The real significance of the Clause was the
power it granted to Congress to specify that effect later.”).
33. See Engdahl, supra note 27, at 1623 (describing the developments of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause at the Constitutional Convention).
34. Max Farrand, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 448
(1913).
35. See Metzger, supra note 19, at 1497 n.106 (explaining Madison’s role in the
creation of the final version of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
36. The “general laws” term likely means that particular states may not be
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The Full Faith and Credit enabling statute of 1790 further confirms
this understanding. The language of that early statute announces that
authenticated records and judicial proceedings “shall have such faith and
credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by
law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or
shall be taken.”37 There is no mention that public acts must be accorded.
Furthermore, the statute clearly departs from the language in Article IV that
appears to mandate “full” faith and credit, rather than “such faith and
credit . . . as” that accorded in sister states. This indicates that Congress, by
enacting the 1790 statute, deliberately chose to require less of states than
the Full Faith and Credit Clause appears to obligate.38 Naturally, the
existence of such a choice implies the power to choose.
Early Supreme Court precedent also aligns with a robust conception of
Congressional power over interstate faith and credit decisions. The disparity
between the description of faith and credit in the Constitution (“full”) and
the description of faith and credit in the enabling act (“such . . . as”)
inevitably engendered confusion.39 The Supreme Court accounted for this
difference by holding that the enabling act, not the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, sets the effect that states must give to out-of-state records and
proceedings.40 The point to emphasize here is that the effect of records and
proceedings fell within the ambit of congressional discretion, and was not
an unbending constitutional requirement. Writing for the Court in one
leading case, Mills v. Duryee, Justice Story stated: “It is manifest, however,
that the Constitution contemplated a power in congress to give a conclusive
effect to [judgments].”41 In other words, Congress, not the Constitution,
defined the scope of the effect an out-of-state judgment would have in other
state courts. Therefore, the 1790 statute was a valid exercise of congressional power over interstate effects. Records and judicial proceedings
would be given precisely the same effect across state lines, while
discriminated against when Congress acts under its Effects Clause power. See id.
(“‘[G]eneral laws’ could be read as preventing measures targeting a specific state’s laws and
judgments (akin to the Constitution’s prohibitions on bills of attainder), or alternatively, as
preventing measures targeting a narrow category of laws and judgments for special
treatment. The former seems the better reading.”).
37. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122.
38. See Engdahl, supra note 27, at 1632 (rationalizing the difference between the
Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause and the 1790 enabling act).
39. Id. at 1587.
40. See Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290, 301–02 (1866) (confirming that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause empowered Congress to determine sister-state effect).
41. See generally Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813).
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recognition of state statutes would not be subject to any federal
requirement.
The picture that emerges from this brief sketch of the historical record
is one of broad, if not plenary, congressional power over interstate relations
involving faith and credit requirements. Antique is the notion that faith and
credit references the evidentiary value out-of-state matters must be given in
a state’s courts, and wisdom may counsel against relying on such
iconoclastic legal arguments. Even deserting the original meaning of faith
and credit would not, however, necessitate a similar retreat from a vigorous
conception of congressional power over interstate relations. What ‘faith and
credit’ constitutes tells us little about the extent of congressional control.
The modern rule of faith and credit not only misconstrues the original
meaning of the text, but it diminishes the congressional role. According to
this approach, the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes an irreducible
constitutional minimum—that is to say, a guarantee—of faith and credit
among the states.42 So construed, the clause reads as an obligation directed
against the states that Congress may not legislate away.43 Consequently,
the grant of authority to Congress in the Effects Clause could only
encompass the power to expand state requirements.44 Congress could not
contract state obligations.45 There is one further implication. If the Full
Faith and Credit Clause is a constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court, not
Congress, has “responsibility for the final arbitration of full faith and credit
questions.”46 In terms of its understanding of the allocation of power
shared among Congress, the states, and the courts, the modern approach,
when juxtaposed against the classic approach, could hardly be more
distinct.
Advocates of the modern view contend that the purpose underlying the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, mainly to secure national unity, is best served
by a rigid constitutional imperative.47 While it is assuredly correct that the
42. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 257 (1992)
(articulating the modern understanding of faith and credit).
43. Id.
44. See Letter from Laurence H. Tribe to Edward M. Kennedy, Senator (May 24,
1996), 142 CONG. REC. 13,359, 13,361 (1996) (arguing that Congress may not eliminate full
faith and credit demands under the Effects Clause) (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL
RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
45. Id.
46. Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 271–72 (1980).
47. See Laycock, supra note 42, at 270–72 (explaining the functional goals of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause).
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clause aims at national cohesion, it is simply wrong to assume that
congressional control over sister-state effect cannot be squared with that
purpose. Congress, unlike any other institution, is a national representative
body and draws together all interested parties. The will of Congress is the
will of the nation. Furthermore, the Effects Clause requires congressional
enactments to be generally applicable, likely meaning that particular states
could not be discriminated against.48 Given these protections, it is difficult
to envision a scenario where congressional prerogative would impair
national unity.
It would also be presumptuous to assume that congressional
authorization of interstate discrimination could not actually enhance
interstate harmony.49 When interstate strife is especially divisive, it may be
wiser to channel passions through the legislative process presupposed by
the congressional power to promulgate general laws that mandate the effect
that certain state acts and judicial proceedings must carry across state lines.
Congress is institutionally well-equipped to decide such a question. And,
picking not quite at random, DOMA may be such a statute. Congress can
account for the competing values at play and might readily conclude that
letting states choose the extent to which they will recognize novel forms of
marriage, rather than retaining the status quo or even forcing interstate
recognition, is the best way to serve national unity.
There is an additional flaw in the modern conception’s understanding
of congressional power. Neither the history nor the text underlying the
Effects Clause can support the peculiar result that would sanction
congressional power to expand faith and credit requirements, but not
contract them. The power to prescribe sister-state effect contemplates the
power to prescribe no effect whatsoever.50 In fact, the concern that
Congress could achieve through the Effects Clause what it could not itself
substantively legislate is greater where Congress expands faith and credit
requirements than where Congress abrogates such requirements. Moreover,
where Congress contracts faith and credit requirements, it “exalt[s] state

48. See Metzger, supra note 19, at 1494 (noting the ambiguity of the “general laws”
requirement, but concluding that it references equal application among all states).
49. See id. at 1501 (explaining the cohesive effect that federally-sanctioned state
discrimination can have).
50. See id. at 1495 (“Indeed, on its face this language would allow Congress to
prescribe that some laws and judgments should be given no effect; after all, it is perfectly
compatible with standard usage to reply ‘none’ or ‘no effect’ when asked to specify the
effect something should have.”).
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power at the expense of national power.”51 As a procedural matter, it
makes less sense to fret about congressional power when such power
enhances the discretion of state sovereigns.52
The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that Congress has
broad latitude to alter the level of faith and credit that states must grant to
sister-state acts, records, and proceedings. The Effects Clause constitutes a
substantive grant of congressional power; one might even say it represents a
“textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch of
government.”53 Under this framework, Section 2 of DOMA would fall well
within the domain of congressional power to prescribe the effect that outof-state marriages have in other states.
But even plenary grants of congressional power have limits, and
Article IV is not a freestanding clause, but is part of a larger constitutional
framework that limits the manner in which Congress may exercise its
power. That congressional action must have a nexus to an enumerated
power is a necessary but not sufficient condition of a statute’s
constitutionality.54 A statute must additionally comport with individual
protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.55 Congress may not act so as
to deprive citizens of their rights without due process of law.56 So while
Congress may act according to an enumerated power, it may not do so in a
manner antithetical to individual rights protections. Congressional action
pursuant to Article I power, therefore, may not run afoul of due process
protections. Likewise, congressional action pursuant to Article IV power
may not run afoul of due process protections. Having concluded that
Congress has the power to contract the faith and credit requirement of
Article IV, the question remains as to whether, by enacting Section 2 of
51. William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A
Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387, 406 (1983).
52. See id. (explaining that federal acts can affect the power of the states).
53. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (stating that if the Effects Clause was
construed as such a textual commitment, it could render disputes over congressional action
pursuant to the clause non-justiciable political questions). In some sense, congressional
power under Article IV mirrors congressional power over the jurisdiction of federal courts in
Article III’s Exceptions Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. (“[T]he supreme Court
shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”).
54. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819) (explaining that
federal power must stem from a grant of authority enumerated in the Constitution).
55. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (stating that the protections in
the Bill of Rights are against federal, not state or local, government).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (creating the due process rights of citizens).
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DOMA, Congress violated due process protections. The constitutionally of
Section 2 of DOMA depends on its compatibility with the Fifth
Amendment.

III. STRICT SCRUTINY: PULLING THE RIGHT TRIGGER
Section 3 of DOMA has already been found unconstitutional by two
district courts.57 One court found that the provision defining marriage as
the union of one man and one woman could not bear scrutiny under the
deferential rational basis test.58 The other court, while invoking a
heightened category of scrutiny, also hinted that the provision would fail
under the rational basis test.59 The rational basis test, of course, was meant
to protect legislative initiatives, which is why these are curious results.60
Perhaps strict scrutiny should apply to challenges to DOMA, if for no other
reason, to protect the integrity of rational basis review. Whether or not strict
scrutiny should apply to Section 2 of DOMA, it may now be appropriate to
assume that strict scrutiny would apply.
Testing legislation under strict scrutiny requires the government to
posit a compelling interest accomplished by the legislation in a fashion that
narrowly achieves that interest.61 Strict scrutiny applies when at least one
of two conditions are obtained: (1) government action infringes on a right
“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental,”62 or, (2) government denies the equal protection of its laws
on the basis of a suspect classification.63 Before one can assert that Section
57. See Gill v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 397 (D. Mass. 2010);
Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(concluding that Section 3 of DOMA violates the equal protection of the laws).
58. See generally Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (applying the rational basis test to
DOMA).
59. See generally Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968 (applying a heightened form of
judicial review, although not strict scrutiny).
60. See Richard Epstein, The Constitutionality of Proposition 8, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 879, 886 (2011) (explaining that rational basis review was intended to protect
legislative action from being dismissed as impermissible deviations from traditional notions
of common law).
61. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1451–66 (2d.
ed. 1988) (discussing the requirements of strict scrutiny).
62. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
63. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“The Fifth Amendment, which is
applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does
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2 of DOMA would survive strict scrutiny, one must determine what
constitutional protection would trigger this most unforgiving form of
judicial review.
Although the practice has not eluded criticism,64 discovering
substantive rights within the meaning of due process, and prohibiting
unwarranted infringement of such rights, forms the basis of much of
modern constitutional law.65 When fundamental rights are implicated by
government regulation, judicial inquiry takes the form of strict scrutiny.
And while the judiciary decides what may constitute a fundamental right,
the Court has “always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive
due process because guideposts for responsible decision making in this
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.”66 To curtail judicial
discretion in this field, a fundamental right may fairly include only those
rights “which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in [our] Nation’s history and
tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”67 The right to
marry, few would dispute, boasts these defining features. The Court has
said as much.68 If marriage is indeed a fundamental right, the reasoning
goes, then prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying constitutes an
infringement of a fundamental right that, when challenged, must be
reviewed under strict scrutiny. Marriage may well be a fundamental right,
the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not
mutually exclusive . . . . [A]s this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”).
64. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW,
18–21, 43–72 (1980) (rejecting a series of justifications for judicial enforcement of
fundamental values, and arguing that “substantive due process is a contradiction in terms—
sort of like green pastel redness”).
65. See Lino Graglia, Rule of Law: Our Constitution Faces Death by “Due Process”,
WALL ST. J., May 24, 2005, at A12 (noting that most of constitutional law is based either on
notions of “due process” or “equal protection”).
66. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (suggesting
that judicial deference should not impede the Court from conducting a more searching
judicial inquiry when fundamental rights are at stake).
66. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
67. Id. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)).
68. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (concluding that a state’s prohibition
of interracial marriage violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (“[O]ur past decisions make clear that the right to
marry is of fundamental importance.”).
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but the right to marry someone of the same sex—to put it mildly—is
something of more recent vintage.69 The question, properly posed, is not
whether marriage is a fundamental right, but whether the right to marry a
person of the same sex is a fundamental right. Defining the individual
interest at stake at the most particularized level has the effect of filtering out
transient causes and the “faddish slogan[s] of the cognoscenti” from that
category of rights essential to our self-understanding as a people.70 So
framed, the right to participate in a state-recognized same-sex marriage
would almost certainly not possess the historical pedigree required for a
right to be deemed fundamental. Likely for this reason, courts are reluctant
to elevate matters touching upon same-sex relationships to fundamental
right status.71
The Constitution also requires that the federal government afford each
citizen equal protection of the laws.72 Not all government distinctions or
classifications violate equal protection. Axiomatic is the proposition that
equal protection does not necessitate absolute equality or enshrine
egalitarianism.73 Rather, the core meaning of equal protection is that
“persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”74 Equal Protection
analysis only brings strict scrutiny into play when a government makes
distinctions that bear on a suspect classification.75 There are four acknowledged criteria for determining whether a suspect class exists: (1) whether
the class has been subject to a history of invidious discrimination, (2)
whether the defining characteristics of the class pertain to a class member’s
ability to contribute to society, (3) whether such characteristics are
immutable, and (4) whether the class lacks political power.76 Credible
69. See Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 361 (2006) (“The idea that same-sex
marriage is even possible is a relatively new one. Until a few decades ago, it was an
accepted truth for almost everyone who ever lived, in any society in which marriage existed,
that there could be marriages only between participants of different sex.”).
70. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. 1984) (declining to hold that
homosexual conduct is a fundamental right).
72. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (concluding that the Fifth
Amendment, while making no reference to equal protection, ensures equal protection
through the Due Process Clause).
73. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
(expressing that equal protection is not absolute).
74. Id.
75. See TRIBE, supra note 61 (discussing strict scrutiny and suspect classifications).
76. See id. at 1616 (“Homosexuality should thus be added—and openly—to the list of
classifications that trigger increased judicial solicitude.”).
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arguments can be constructed that would either include or exclude
homosexuals from characterization as a suspect class on these bases.
Because homosexuality is associated with a history of discrimination, and
because no one can seriously contend that homosexuality limits an
individual’s capacity to contribute to our society, most arguments would
likely focus on the immutability of same-sex attraction, and the political
power of homosexual Americans. Courts have found in the past that
homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class.77
This brief overview could give one pause before asserting that strict
scrutiny must apply to classifications drawn by DOMA. Having accepted
uncontested, however, that strict scrutiny does in fact apply, the choice
remains between which route should be taken to reach that result. For
reasons of both strategy and political theory, advocates of same-sex
marriage are on stronger footing on equal protection grounds.
Creating new constitutional rights is tricky business. It is one thing to
deploy new permutations of older understandings of our rights in the
service of expanding familiar constitutional protections. It is quite another
matter to invoke the indeterminacy of substantive due process to expand the
sphere of constitutional rights at the expense of political choice. Courts that
wade through the murky depths of substantive due process may find their
perception so obscured that the values which courts discern can only bear
striking resemblance to the values of the judiciary itself. Such a process
contains the potential to be “so flagrantly elitist and undemocratic that it
should be dismissed forthwith.”78 In that vein, Justice White, dissenting in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, warned that when the Court creates a new
constitutional right without a clear textual command it “comes nearest to
illegitimacy.”79 White’s point echoes an earlier admonition by Justice
Jackson:
The burden should rest heavily upon one who would persuade us to use
the due process clause to strike down a substantive law or
ordinance . . . Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due process
grounds leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct which many
people find objectionable. Invocation of the equal protection clause, on
the other hand, does not disable any governmental body from dealing
77. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (declining to classify
distinctions drawn on the basis of sexual orientation as suspect); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741
F.2d 1388, 1396 (D.C. 1984) (concluding that the military may discharge service members
for engaging in homosexual conduct).
78. ELY, supra note 64, at 59.
79. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977).
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with the subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or
regulation must have a broader impact . . . Courts can take no better
measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal
in operation.80

All of this is to say that the equal protection route offers a less unsettling means to reach strict scrutiny than does the substantive due process
route. To say that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right, to say that it
holds a privileged place over and above far more familiar rights, would
come as news to a sizable portion of the country. To say, on the other hand,
that marriage law should conform to the principle of equal protection, an
elemental norm of our constitutional order, would not ring so discordant in
the ear of the listener attuned to the Court’s jurisprudence. For that reason,
the equal protection clause, not the due process clause, could plausibly
trigger strict scrutiny. That is the stronger argument.
Before a government regulation may be upheld using strict scrutiny
under equal protection analysis, the government has the burden of showing
that the discriminatory law in question is necessary to serve a compelling
government interest.81 Scholars have frequently noted the formulation that
strict judicial review is “strict in theory and fatal in fact.”82 Understandably
then, the question of what level of scrutiny must be applied is of such
gravity that it pulls much legal debate into its orbit. But familiarity breeds
laxity, and the facile maxim that strict scrutiny effectively ends the matter
can cause us to overlook what is really the key question: whether a law can
withstand the level of scrutiny that is applied to it. The remainder of this
note proposes a potential argument for how the Section 2 of DOMA can
indeed survive strict scrutiny.

80. Railway Express Co. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112–13 (1949).
81. See TRIBE, supra note 61 (explaining the requirements that must be met by
legislation under strict scrutiny).
82. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (noting that
laws reviewed under strict scrutiny are likely to be struck down). But see Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (finding that internment of a particular race of citizens
during wartime survived strict scrutiny); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact:
An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006)
(noting that, as an empirical matter, laws have frequently survived strict scrutiny).
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IV. DOMA’s COMPELLING INTEREST
Anterior to the question of whether or not a government interest is
compelling, is the question of what interest is actually in play. Congress
proffered four distinct interests achieved by DOMA: (1) fostering
responsible procreative activity, (2) promoting the traditional conception of
marriage, (3) defending traditional moral norms, and (4) preserving scarce
government resources.83 A House Judiciary Committee report lamenting
the “orchestrated assault being waged against traditional heterosexual
marriage” was somewhat less discreet.84 Whether or not one would
consider these interests to be compelling, they fail to capture the federalist
implications simmering beneath the surface of the debate. They also rely on
an expansive view of the role for the federal government in the regulation
of marriage. The interests identified reach the question of whether or not
federally-recognized marriages should be limited to one man and one
woman, but they do not extend their reach to the pertinent question of this
analysis: whether the federal government may favor the marital arrangements of one state over another.
And, favoritism is precisely what is at issue here. Heterosexual
marriages, with a few exceptions on the margins, are on equal footing from
state to state.85 When states begin to confer marital status upon same-sex
couples and the federal government not only declines to require, but
actively alters the law to eliminate any potential requirement of faith and
credit, the government engages in discrimination. The government, in
effect, carves out an exception to a general constitutional principle in order
to release states opposed to same-sex marriage from any potential
obligation to recognize such marriages.
For reasons already outlined, Congress’s dominion over faith and
credit requirements permits just this sort of thing. When Congress draws
distinctions in the process of acting upon that power, however, it must do so
in a way that satisfies the demands of equal protection inherent in the Fifth
Amendment.86 By pointing out same-sex unions as relationships that need
83. See Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 997–98 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (listing, only to reject as insufficient, the proffered government interests behind
DOMA).
84. H.R. Rep. No. 104-664 at 2−3 (1996).
85. See EUGENE SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICTS OF LAW, 557–95 (4th ed. 2004)
(explaining faith and credit given to marriage across state lines, and how certain conflicts
over state laws can arise in the context of domestic relations).
86. See Geoffrey Stone, Deconstructing DOMA, HUFFINGTON POST (July 20, 2010,
12:33 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/deconstructing-domab652749.html
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not be recognized as valid by other states, Congress created a regime where
same-sex couples who obtained legal marriage licenses in one state could
be discriminated against in a different state. The constitutional obstacle
arises not because Congress contracted the scope of the Full Faith and
Credit requirement, but because it did so in a manner that legitimates
discrimination against legally-wedded same-sex couples.
The very term “discrimination” conjures up ugly chapters in American
history, and so is etched with an indelibly negative connotation. Perhaps for
that reason, much modern democratic discourse is stunted when one side of
the argument invokes the haunting specter of discrimination lurking
beneath our policy judgments. But that is not to say that discriminatory
government action is impermissible simply by virtue of its discriminatory
character. The intelligibility of a great deal of government action hinges on
the permissibility of certain forms of discrimination.87 The question is not
so much whether government has engaged in discrimination, but whether
government discrimination is repugnant to the Constitution.88 Legitimate
discrimination should create the impression that government is acting
according to sound judgment (which, of course, is the original and positive
connotation that once attached to the term).
Having assumed at the outset that strict scrutiny would apply to the
distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex marriages drawn by
DOMA, only a compelling government interest could enable the law to
withstand a constitutional challenge. To find a compelling government
interest, one must look to DOMA not at the time of its adoption, but
DOMA today, keeping in mind the developments that have occurred since
1996. That new rationales constructed to support the constitutionality of
DOMA will inevitably be post-hoc justifications is not problematic so long
as the new rationales are connected to the classification as originally
drawn.89
It may be time to stop pointing to traditional moral norms of conduct
to justify government action. Not because such arguments have lost their
potency, but because they have been met by an increasingly skeptical
judicial eye. Arguments asserting the government’s interest in cultivating a
(noting that government makes numerous distinctions with great frequency, and that only a
small percentage of them actually give rise to an equal protection claim).
87. See id.
88. See id..
89. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(explaining that government may put forward justifications for legislation that may not have
been the original motivation underlying a statute).
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particular moral order are no longer in vogue, and have not garnered the
support of a majority of the Supreme Court in recent years.90 What Robert
Bork derisively terms the “autonomy agenda” rules the day. And, as that
agenda becomes enshrined in the Constitution, the sphere of political choice
wanes.91 Scant indeed is the evidence that presages reversal of this trend.
The hubristic dismissal of arguments resting on tradition or morality
may be irksome to some, but it is not necessarily the death knell for
DOMA. While there can be little doubt that the intent behind DOMA was
to forestall the advent of same-sex marriage across the country and to
preserve what Congress perceived as the natural rather than sociallyconstructed definition of marriage, there are sound interests DOMA
achieves that implicate the moral component of the debate, but only
indirectly. Legislation may vindicate compelling interests apart from public
morality even if the legislation incidentally or even substantially has the
effect (which may even be intentional) of advancing public morality.
There is a basic difference between enacting a law to preserve a moral
understanding and enacting a law to enable a jurisdiction to preserve a
moral understanding if it chooses to do so. If, for example, every state in
the nation elected to legalize same-sex marriage, there would be nothing in
DOMA that could ultimately prevent it.92 Additionally, DOMA does not
pose any obstacle to states that, while perhaps not willing to allow same-sex
marriage, wish to give full legal recognition to same-sex marriages
performed in other states. Viewed in this context, a compelling government
interest emerges quite apart from bolstering a government-sanctioned moral
code: DOMA enables each state to safeguard its own moral vision and
enables those states disinclined to confer social legitimacy on same-sex
marriage (either by creating a right to same-sex marriage or by providing
benefits incident to marital status) to refrain from doing so.
In a nation as expansive and as increasingly diverse as the United
States, morality is defined at increasingly localized levels. The federalist
structure created by the Constitution anticipates a broad range of
90. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (concluding that legislation that served to discriminate against homosexuals could not
be cured by resorting to the state’s police power to regulate communal morals).
91. See Robert H. Bork, The Necessary Amendment, FIRST THINGS, Aug.−Sept. 2004,
at 145, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/the-necessary-amendment-27 (arguing that the judiciary will inevitably find a right to same-sex marriage given that it
views exercises in human autonomy as fundamental rights).
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (employing language that derogates from obligation
rather than adding to obligation).
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permissible regulatory regimes across the states. It is the mark of our
constitutional system that different states, our laboratories of democracy, as
Justice Brandeis called them, may experiment with a host of legal and
institutional arrangements. On that premise, a state should not be compelled
to allow another state’s experimentation to run its course within its own
borders. Admittedly, giving full faith and credit to same-sex marriages
performed out-of-state is not the same as forcing a state itself to recognize
same-sex marriage. But it would involve the state in conferring the tangible
benefits that marital status affords. That alone may be enough to dilute the
moral message a state seeks to convey by withholding its imprimatur from
same-sex marriage.
Critics of this justification may contend that the federal government
has taken sides in the moral argument, clearly favoring states opposed to
same-sex marriage.93 But moral neutrality may not even be possible in the
situation faced here. It is one thing to assert that the federal government
should be neutral, although it is worth noting that that itself is a non-neutral
moral claim.94 Consider though, that if the vast majority of states were
forced to recognize the same-sex marriages taking place in the states that
permit them, such sweeping change in marriage law would render the
federal government’s failure to act as it did when it passed DOMA a tacit
admission that it supported the jurisdictions effecting the change. Indeed,
when the federal government is confronted with the options of either
safeguarding or rendering vulnerable a particular moral understanding, it is
no criticism at all to say that the government has advanced the moral views
of one side of the argument. It can do no other.
In the debate over the nature of marriage, where passions run high and
disagreements run deep, moral neutrality is simply untenable. In the
American context, politics, as the platitude goes, is played within the 40yard lines.95 This means that Americans, for the most part, share a vision of
what we as a people aspire to achieve. That compatibility is especially
forceful in the economic realm, where disagreements arise over the proper
means to obtaining certain ends, and the ends themselves are always
93. See Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 923,
934 (2010) (viewing DOMA as intended to advance the moral views of government).
94. See Robert George, THE CLASH OF THE ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND
MORALITY IN CRISIS (2001) (arguing that moral neutrality within the same-sex marriage
debate is wholly implausible).
95. See Charles Krauthammer, A Vote for the 40-yard Lines, WASH. POST, Nov. 5,
2010, at A18 (arguing that ideological disparities in the American context are relatively
limited).
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agreed-upon by disputants in the political debate. Because social issues,
such as same-sex marriage, frequently provoke disagreement not only over
the means that should be employed to achieve a just society but the very
vision of a just society itself, public debate is destined to be divisive.
The debate over same-sex marriage entails more than wrangling over
the allocation of economic benefits or semantic squabbles over the
definition of marriage. To suggest otherwise is to belittle both sides of the
argument. What matters to same-sex marriage advocates is the social
legitimacy that the marital relation confers on its participants. What matters
is how the rest of society views the same-sex relationship. The question of
same-sex marriage can be readily separated from the issue of the tangible
benefits granted by government. If the debate remained at the superficial
level of economic benefits, consensus could be reached if states offered
civil unions. Both proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage
recognize, however, that the marital relationship confers intangible benefits
as well. When a state bestows the title of marriage to same-sex couples, it is
doing more than granting benefits; it is making a moral claim that a samesex relationship is of equal value to society as an opposite-sex relationship.
To borrow from Charles Fried: “To the extent it’s something other than a
collection of benefits, calling it ‘marriage’ represents a sign of society’s
approval, society’s ‘coming to the party’ [in celebration of the union].”96
Massachusetts may have joined the party some time ago, but that is no
reason to require Pennsylvania to attend. Where there is ongoing debate
over the very nature of marriage itself, an issue that cuts to the center of
society’s moral fabric, the mundane matters of faith and credit are drawn
into deeper questions reaching our very self-understanding as a people.
To see how a state’s prohibition of same-sex marriage can be undercut
if it were required to provide full faith and credit to out-of-state same-sex
marriages, consider the very plausible following illustration: After a long
and hard-fought debate, state X legalizes same-sex marriage. State Y, which
shares a border with state X, prohibits same-sex marriage. The popular
governor of state Y (which does not have term limits for its elected
officials) has repeatedly declared that same-sex marriage will never be
legalized “as long as I’m around.” Excited by the news about state X and
realizing that prospects for same-sex marriage in state Y are bleak, same-sex
couples in state Y travel to state X, get married, and return home to state Y.
96. David Lat, The Breyer-Fried Discussion: Some Highlights (Part 2), ABOVE THE
LAW (Dec. 13, 2006, 11:50 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2006/12/the-breyer-frieddiscussion-some-highlights-part-2/ (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC.
JUST.).
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In one sense, nothing has changed. State Y’s choice to prohibit samesex marriage remains intact. The prohibition is still law, and marriage
licenses are still not granted to same-sex couples. The same-sex couples
that traveled to state X return, and the lives of the citizens of state Y
continue as usual. In another subtler sense, very much has changed. Slowly,
as questions over the rights of these newly-married same-sex couples
emerge in different legal contexts, state Y begins to grant marital benefits,
once the exclusive enjoyment of opposite-sex couples, to same-sex couples.
What, then, has become of state Y’s law against same-sex marriage? Yes, it
may still exist on paper, but many of the modes in which that prohibition
once expressed itself have become unavailable.
The situation is not unique to same-sex marriage. The same principles
would apply to a young, wily couple not yet old enough to legally marry in
their home state.97 If they have the gumption to travel across state lines,
wed, and return to their home state, the home state’s age requirements could
easily be evaded unless the home state was somehow empowered to refuse
to recognize the out-of-state marriage. Here, as in the case of same-sex
marriage, we see that the law is a teacher, and the lessons that the law
articulates become less clear when its instruction can largely be
circumvented. The moral choices of one community thus begin to dictate
the permissible moral choices of a different community.
The federal government’s interest in these circumstances is clear. In a
clash of moral visions where government neutrality is untenable, the
government has an interest in ensuring that one state’s moral choices
remain undisturbed by another state’s moral choices. To reiterate, the
difference between enacting a law to preserve a moral understanding and
enacting a law to enable a jurisdiction to preserve a moral understanding, if
it chooses to do so, is constitutionally significant. That such an interest may
be a post-hoc justification that emerges only after legislation is adopted,
rather than contemporaneous with its adoption, poses no obstacle when
defending against an equal protection claim.98
The question that remains is whether such an interest can fairly fall
under the category of interests that are compelling. That question must be
addressed in light of the structural features of the Constitution. Federalist
implications underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause are frequently
97. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 1980–92 (explaining choice of law principles when
a state may have to recognize a marriage that could not have been validly performed within
its own borders).
98. See Perry, supra note 89 (explaining that new government interests may be
proffered to justify legislation).
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overlooked because federalism is most often conceived of vertically.99 That
is to say, federalism empowers the states to cultivate an identity separate
from the federal government. The federal government may not coerce or
commandeer the states to effectuate its own ends.100 When a state enters
the union, it surrenders certain features of sovereignty to the federal
government, but it retains broad powers to shape its own identity.101 The
principles of federalism require the maintenance of a dual sovereignty, by
which the states and federal government occupy separate domains.102
Residual state sovereignty would be much less meaningful if state choices
were subject to internecine attacks by fellow states. Inherent in federalism,
then, is not only vertical symbiosis between the federal government and the
states, but also horizontal comity among the states. Vertical federalism
presupposes horizontal federalism.
Just as federalism can be divided according to its different effects, so
too can it be divided according to the goals that it serves. Creation of a dual
sovereign, which requires power-sharing, as opposed to power-concentration, adds a layer of protection for the individual liberty of citizens.
Alexander Hamilton, writing in Federalist No. 28, notes that the dual
sovereignty scheme would cause both sovereigns to “exercise authority to
the citizens’ benefit: If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use
of the other as the instrument of redress.”103 Consonant with this theme was
Justice Kennedy’s recent paean to federalism:
Federalism is more than an exercise in setting the boundary between
different institutions of government for their own integrity. “State
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather, federalism secures to
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign
power’” . . . Federalism secures the freedom of the individual. It allows
States to respond, through the enactment of positive law, to the initiative
of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times

99. See Allen Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2 (2008) (discussing
federalism’s under-theorized components that relate to the relationships among states).
100. See Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the federal government
may not require state officials to administer federal programs); see also South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (discussing that the federal government may not coerce
states into adopting federal policy objectives).
101. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 48 (1996) (affirming the
concept of residual state sovereignty).
102. See The Federalist, supra note 1, at 201 (“The proposed Constitution . . . is, in
strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both.”).
103. Id. at 195.
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without having to rely solely upon the political processes that control a
remote central power.104

Federalism serves to enhance individual liberty protections. Creating a
second, more localized sovereign apart from the centralized federal
government offers citizens a better chance to be heard in the social
discourse. This benefit correlates with vertical federalism. Horizontal
federalism carries its advantages as well. States will be able to address
public policy issues with creativity and in accordance with their citizens’
preferences, free from any undue intrusion on the part of outside states.105
Horizontal federalism throws states into a nation-wide competition with one
another that can benefit all citizens throughout the country by offering a
variety of legal regimes under which a citizen may decide to live.106
To say that the states may shape their own identities tells us little about
the degree to which they may do so. To say that the states need not conform
to a homogenized national morality tells us little about the degree to which
morality may become regionalized. Indeed, proffering state diversity as a
compelling government interest refers back to the original question of the
purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. If, however, the framers
designed the Full Faith and Credit Clause to encourage national unity, the
question remains as to whether there is a compelling government interest in
eliminating requirements for which the Constitution may call.
The answer, of course, lies in Congress’s unique ability, as a national
representative body, to determine what, in fact, serves the united national
interest. Congress, not the courts, sets the quantum of the faith and credit
that the Constitution requires.107 We must assume simply by virtue of the
fact that Congress qua Congress has acted, that the united national interest
has been served. If, after legislative bouts, certain state factions emerge
victorious over other state factions, it will have been because the Congress
has judged that it ought to be so. That judgment is the judgment of the
nation speaking with one voice.
By enacting DOMA, Congress has chosen to reduce faith and credit
requirements, thereby expanding the power of the states to foster separate
moral identities beyond any default rule of the Constitution. This result is
104. Bond v. U.S., 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (U.S. 2011) (citations omitted).
105. See Erbsen, supra note 99, at 19 (explaining the benefits of horizontal federalism).
106. See id. (explaining further the benefits of horizontal federalism).
107. See Engdahl, supra note 27, at 1659 (“Efforts to moderate and accommodate a free
people’s fiercely held differences is what statecraft and political dialogue—not judicial
fiat—are for.”).
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not a contradiction of the principles of the Full Faith and Credit Clause but
a possibility embedded in the Effects Clause.108 In other words, the Effects
Clause gives the federal government the power to expand the permissible
range of state sovereignty vis-à-vis faith and credit questions. DOMA, then,
is an exercise in what could be termed fortified federalism.
Having identified a cognizable legal interest in DOMA, and having
demonstrated that that interest is a subspecies of federalism, it remains to
explain what is compelling about that interest. An interest, however
legitimate, will not overcome an equal protection challenge under strict
scrutiny unless it is compelling.109 Federalism, of course, is not a policy
preference; it is constitutionally prescribed.110 Here, the government need
not rely on arguments about the importance of morality and tradition in
society but may rely on this basic feature of our constitutional system.
Rather than draw from policy concerns extrinsic to the Constitution, the
compelling interest of DOMA exists within the framework ordained by the
Constitution itself.
To clarify the interest at stake, consider the primary justifications
underlying federalism. The creation of a dual sovereign, rather than a single
sovereign, permits states to compete with one another in a manner that
ultimately benefits citizens of the country.111 A state can determine for
itself the goods and services it affords to citizens and the tax rate at which it
does so in order to induce citizens to flock to the state and to enhance
economic growth.112 The same principle applies to the question of
marriage. A same-sex couple residing in a state that does not recognize
same-sex marriage may deem the guarantee of marriage important enough
to leave their home state and move to the state that does recognize same-sex
marriage. It would be difficult to imagine citizens leaving a state solely
because it permits same-sex marriage. There are, then, potential economic
costs that result when a state refuses to grant marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. Same-sex couples may simply vote with their feet, leaving their
108. See Metzger, supra note 19, at 1506 (explaining the procedural protections of
federalism).
109. See TRIBE, supra note 61 (explaining the requirements legislation must meet under
strict scrutiny).
110. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the principles of federalism should not be subjected to
the whim of federal and state actors, but rather, should be protected by the Court).
111. See Clayton Gillete, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds,
58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1030, 1031–33 (1983) (explaining the economic incentives created by
federalism).
112. See id.
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home state for seemingly more broad-minded communities. States that
refuse to recognize same-sex marriage do so in spite of the potential
economic boon that it could provide. To these states, the moral conviction
of the community trumps any economic incentive. These distinctions
among states are the stuff of federalism.
These interests touch upon the very core of our constitutional structure
and, in that regard, should be accorded even greater weight than what is
given to worthy policy objectives. For example, the Court has held that
achieving the educational benefits that stem from racial diversity is a
compelling interest, at least in the classroom setting, and can be invoked to
defeat an equal protection claim.113 As noble as that sort of interest might
be, it does not strike at the heart of our constitutional system in the same
way that federalism concerns do. Whether or not affirmative action
programs will be adopted is a matter fit for public debate. There can be no
discussion, however, about whether or not government officials should or
should not adhere to the principles of federalism, because the role of the
states in our Republic is, to use Justice Powell’s attractive quip, “a matter of
constitutional law, not of legislative grace.”114
Rather than viewing federalism and the principles of full faith and
credit as competing values, they should be viewed instead as
complementary values, both prerequisites to a properly functioning political
system. There exists a permissible spectrum within our constitutional
framework that neither gives undue weight to federalism nor to full faith
and credit. DOMA amply fits within that spectrum. DOMA simply permits
states to exercise their autonomy to resist novel forms of marriage. DOMA
bolsters the status quo as it existed throughout the history of the Republic.
There is nothing radical or extreme about that. The motif of federalism,
even the fortified federalism that results from state contraction of faith and
credit requirements, supports the ultimate and indeed compelling
government interest in ensuring that morality remains regionally defined.

113. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that a state-run university
system may consider the racial identity of applicants because it serves the compelling
government interest of achieving diversity in the classroom).
114. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567.
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A. NARROW TAILORING
The presence of a compelling interest does not suffice to defeat an
equal protection claim analyzed under strict scrutiny. Courts require
legislatures to legislate with efficiency. To this end, courts will not uphold
an equal protection claim if the law under scrutiny, in relation to the interest
advanced, is either overinclusive or underinclusive.115 A law is overinclusive if it curtails legitimate conduct that, if left unperturbed by the law,
would not undermine the government interest at stake.116 Likewise, a law is
underinclusive if it fails to address conduct that undermines the government
interest at stake.117 DOMA furthers the government’s compelling interest
in retaining the structures of federalism that allow states to forge their own
moral identities. It achieves this interest by immunizing one state’s
conception of marriage from contrary conceptions espoused by other states.
We must ask whether DOMA actually achieves that intended aim with a
precise fit between the means utilized and the objective sought.
On its very terms, Section 2 of DOMA reads, “No State . . . shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
any other State . . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same
sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State . . . . ”118
DOMA forbids nothing, but instead affirmatively grants states the
discretion to choose not to recognize a same-sex marriage performed out of
state. In this respect, DOMA is far less intrusive than a national rule of faith
and credit that would require non-recognition of out-of-state marriages.
Moreover, there is debate about whether, even in the absence of a
congressionally-sanctioned abrogation of faith and credit, states could
refuse to recognize out-of-state marriages on the premise that to do so
would violate that state’s public policy.119 While DOMA is unprecedented
in the sense that Congress had never before contracted faith and credit
requirements, Section 2 does nothing more than give states a power that

115. See TRIBE, supra note 61, at 1446–50 (explaining the meaning of narrow
tailoring).
116. See id. (explaining overinclusiveness).
117. See id. (explaining underinclusiveness).
118. The Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. 293 (1996).
119. See generally Kramer, supra note 11 (claiming that the public policy exception
permits states to nullify faith and credit requirements if doing so would violate “some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deeprooted tradition of the common weal”).

178

19 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 151 (2012)

they may have already possessed through different means.120 Such is the
modesty of the faith and credit provision.
Of course, DOMA does not speak to civil unions. The very concept of
a civil union did not creep into the mainstream until after DOMA was
passed. A civil union is a state-specific guarantee of the economic benefits
that heterosexual marriages are given. Civil unions are only valid in the
state in which they are formed and cannot be taken across state lines
(although a state may choose to grant benefits to couples that formed civil
unions elsewhere).121 This raises the specter of underinclusiveness. After
all, many claim that civil unions are simply marriage by another name, or a
halfway house on the way to marriage, so close to marriage that their
recognition dilutes the moral message sent by reserving marriage to
opposite-sex relationships. According to proponents of same-sex marriage,
civil unions, while a mark of progress, should not temper efforts to secure
marriage rights in the fullest sense of the term. To call a same-sex union a
“marriage” is profoundly forceful symbolism. If same-sex couples can
flourish in one of the bedrock institutions of the society, then any moral
stigma attached to same-sex relations would, in time, vanish. It is that very
possibility that offers justification for the federal government’s concern
over same-sex marriage but not civil unions. To take the step from civil
unions to marriage is to confer legitimacy, to align the force of social
convention behind same-sex couples. That is precisely what states that still
resist same-sex marriage seek to avoid. Both opponents and proponents of
same-sex marriage continue to acknowledge a distinction between civil
unions and same-sex marriage. That DOMA tacitly does as well does not
render the law underinclusive.
DOMA represents a blanket exemption to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.122 Government distinctions cannot be overinclusive. That is to say,
distinctions cannot be drawn so as to burden groups or individuals the
burdening of which does not serve the government interest achieved by the
distinction. A state’s definition of marriage falls within the ambit of the
interests that DOMA seeks to advance. Here, terminology is of crucial
importance. To alter the definition of marriage is to alter the moral meaning
rooted in marriage itself. Yet, acknowledging the same-sex marriages of
120. Id.
121. See EUGENE SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICTS OF LAW 557–95 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining
faith and credit given to novel domestic partnerships across state lines, and how certain
conflicts over state laws can arise in the context of domestic relations).
122. See Koppelman, supra note 18, at 939 (calling Section 2 of DOMA a “blanket
non-recognition” rule).
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other states can actually serve to reinforce the state’s moral understanding
of marriage: it will acknowledge those same-sex marriages that it must in
order to adhere to the Constitution, but it will steadfastly resist endorsing
such marriages itself. Beyond the problem created by enabling same-sex
couples to travel across borders in order to get married, only to return to
their home state and enjoy the benefits of full marital rights, is the issue of
whether requiring the state to acknowledge just one same-sex marriage
would be sufficient to muddy the moral message a state seeks to convey by
confining marriage to its traditional boundaries.
Then again, it may be prudent to ask how clear the moral message has
to be anyway. Missouri would not be any less Missouri if it acknowledged
same-sex marriages that take place in Iowa, composing as they do a tiny
minority of all marriages throughout the state and the country. When,
however, there exists a strong enough incentive for a large number of samesex couples to deliberately travel to another state for the sole purpose of
getting married only to return to their home state, there is great potential
that the effect would be similar to what would occur if Missouri itself had
enacted legislation recognizing same-sex marriage. There would then be a
critical mass of same-sex marriages that would lead citizens to deduce that
same-sex marriage, being of equal legal validity to traditional marriage,
would be of equal moral validity as well.
DOMA does not so much as dictate a rule to be followed.123 It offers
an avenue for states to follow if such states wish to continue to recognize
only those marriages congenial to the state’s moral views. It does not
impose. It proposes.
B. LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS
The final requirement that must be met prior to upholding a law under
strict scrutiny is showing that the law employs the least restrictive means
toward achieving the government interest in question.124 One common
misunderstanding is that DOMA covers all same-sex marriages, and, in a
single stroke, snatches away any cross-state legitimacy that these marriages
may have otherwise enjoyed. As we have repeatedly seen, DOMA does not
compel states to do or change anything. The federal government does not
123. See generally William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal
Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2012) (showing that DOMA does not dictate states to adopt
particular choice of law rules).
124. See TRIBE, supra note 61 (explaining the requirements of strict scrutiny).
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retain the power to regulate morality.125 It would be mistaken to argue that
the federal government has a moral interest in the very definition of
marriage because such an interest is reserved to the states. The interest of
the federal government, while related to the moral concerns implicated in
the same-sex marriage debate, is in fostering the federalist structures
designed by our Constitution which enable cross-state competition and
allow states to forge unique identities. That the morality of a community
may form an integral part of a state’s identity is no objection.
The escape-hatch offered by DOMA’s limitation of faith and credit
requisites is not meant to cultivate public morality per se but to preserve a
state’s prerogative to choose for itself what arrangements deserve the label
of marriage. That prerogative can only be fully preserved by the blanket
exception established in DOMA. Note also that this argument holds even if
more jurisdictions were to recognize same-sex marriage within the U.S.
Even if forty-nine states came to legalize same-sex marriage, this argument
would still hold. The states are not a conglomerate but separate jurisdictions
with separate concerns, aspirations and moral understandings.126 DOMA
retains that view of the states in our constitutional system and nothing
more. DOMA is no more restrictive than it need be.
C. JETTISONING MORAL PRETENSION
The foregoing analysis, then, proposes a novel argument that, if
applied, would uphold the constitutionality of Section 2 of DOMA even
under strict scrutiny, the grim reaper of constitutional jurisprudence. Rather
than resting on moral assumptions that are no longer widely shared, the
argument rests on a classic conception of congressional power over
interstate relations, and how that conception squares with a chief rationale
of federalism, that is, keeping moral choices at the state, rather than federal,
level.
The debate over same-sex marriage circles around the intangible
benefits that flow from society’s legal recognition of same-sex marriage. It
quite obviously does not concern the tangible benefits of marriage, which
may easily be conferred through civil unions. Legal recognition creates an
aura of legitimacy. Relationships once thought aberrant would suddenly
125. See U.S. v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1974 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(observing that the federal government may not exercise general police powers).
126. See Erbsen, supra note 99, at 22 (commenting on the practical meaning of
sovereignty).
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become worthy of honor, respect, and celebration. In time, those who once
harbored objections to these relationships would slowly accept that they
have lost the debate and direct their concern toward other pressing issues
that have not yet been settled in the public forum. Ultimately, society itself
will have changed; a new moral character will have been forged. That is
what advocates of same-sex marriage propose and seek.
That, also, is precisely what states opposed to same-sex marriage seek
to avoid. It is precisely what DOMA enables states to avoid. There is, of
course, precedent for forcing unwilling states to succumb to a new moral
vision under the banner of equal rights. Indeed, much overt racial
discrimination fell by the wayside precisely because the law moved in the
direction of equality, which over time impelled social acceptance of racial
integration.127 Even then, however, progress was painfully slow.128 One
should not forget that the question of racial equality was settled by debate at
the federal level, and the federal government took sides in the moral
argument, even at the expense of state identity and federalism concerns.129
If the federal government may issue policy choices that run counter to
the spirit of federalism, surely it may issue policy choices that bolster
federalism. The idea that same-sex marriage is even possible is itself
relatively new.130 Until only very recently, it was beyond debate for most
cultures, certainly including our own, that marriages could only be
composed of participants of different sex.131 The growing acceptance of
same-sex marriage in recent years allows the inference that same-sex
marriage will become more prevalent in the coming years. Section 2 of
DOMA merely ensures that that process will play out state by state, without
undue interference by competing states. While that process may also be
painfully slow, that is no reason to suppose it is an unconstitutional one.
Still less should one suppose that a law that keeps that process in place,
rather than expediting it, is unconstitutional.

127. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEAL OF
PROGRESS (1978) (discussing the social influence the Supreme Court exercised in the
segregation cases, which led society toward not only legal condemnation of segregation, but
moral condemnation as well).
128. See id.
129. See id
130. See Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 361 (2006) (explaining the historical
pedigree of same-sex marriage).
131. See id
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V. CONCLUSION

We have seen that Congress has the power to alter the degree to which
states must accord faith and credit to sister states. That power, while
considerable, is limited by the Fifth Amendment. We have further seen that
the federal interest achieved in DOMA, preserving regional conceptions of
the moral order, is compatible with the aims of federalism. Acting to fortify
the underlying goals of federalism constitutes a compelling interest. Unlike
other ostensible government interests, the interest advanced by Section 2 of
DOMA is rooted in the Constitution itself and is not just another policy
choice. The manner in which DOMA achieves this interest is neither
overinclusive nor underinclusive, doing so instead in the least restrictive
fashion possible. Accepting this argument, Section 2 of DOMA can survive
its inevitable encounter with strict scrutiny. It can elude the grim reaper.

